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W.: Taxation--Occupational Tax--Lien for Unpaid Tax Upon "Property Us
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ican Law Institute has adopted this modern rule.'- The instant
case does not come within the first of the three situations because
of failure to allege a retention of control in the landlord nor within the second for there was no undertaking as to the part of the
chimney in P's part of the house; nor is it within the third for
there was no consideration alleged. The court does not indicate
what it would do if consideration were alleged; its action in refusing
to recognize a duty growing out of the gratuitous promise finds
respectable support elsewhere.28

P. W .11.
TAXATION -

OCCUPATIONAL TAX -

LEN FOP. U

AID TAX

UPON " PROPFRTY USED N Busnm s ". - Under a contract for the
construction of a jail, a county court retained a stipulated minimum
of the contract price pending completion. The contractor, already
in default in payment of a privilege tax upon those engaged "in
the business of contracting",' failed to complete its undertaking,
and the work was taken over and completed by the surety. An
issue arose over the disposition of the fund in the hands of the
county court. Held, that a contract for the construction of a building under which the contractor is to receive money is property2
used in the business of contracting within the meaning of the
statute imposing a lien, 4 in favor of the state for the gross sales tax,
on property used in the business or occupation on which such tax
(1919);
AtI. 283
theory",
S. W. 87

(b) "foreseeability theory", Stevens v. Yale, 101 Conn. 684, 127
(1924); Comment (1936) 34 Mica. L. Rsv. 917; (c) "estoppel
Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186
(1916); of. 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 90.
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 357, 378.
28 Bailey v. First Realty Co., 305 Mass. 306, 25 N. E. (2d) 712 (1940);
Rosenberg v. Krinick, 116 N. J. L. 597, 186 Atl. 446 (1936).
1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13, § 2e.
in the principal case, Judge Fox said: " ....
the
all-inclusive term 'property' was, we think, intended to cover not only the
physical and tangible property of a taxpayer used in his business, but all other
property, of whatever character, which was a part of his assets and which are
used or relied upon to carry on his activities as a contractor." Italics supplied. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. County Court of Lewis County, 15 S.
E. 3 (2d) 302, 303 (W. Va. 1941).
Rationalizing that the contract and the income are used in the business,
the court said, at 303-304: "In most instances the contract is the one thing
that enables the taxpayer to carry on his activities, and to say that accruals
of earnings thereunder are not property and subject to the tax imposed on! the
gross income of the business is not, in our opinion, a reasonable construction of
the statute under consideration."
4 W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13, § 12.
2 In defining "property"
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is imposed. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. County Court
of Lewis CDounty.3
An application of the rule that tax statutes are to be construed
strictly in favor of the taxpayer 6 might result in the conclusion
that "property used in the business" means only tangible property.' However, the life of the law is not logic8 and the courts in
interpreting tax and tax lien statutes have given a liberal construction to the word "property" in favor of the taxing body.9 The
guiding principle behind such decisions is equality of taxation; uniformity in assessing taxes being meaningless unless accompanied by
uniformity in collection. A narrow construction would not only
create discrimination and inequality, but would also hamper the
state in the collection of taxes from taxpayers with substantial intangible assets.
The principal case, although foreseeable in result, has removed
any doubt as to the meaning of the phrase "property used in the
515 S.E. (2d) 302 (W. Va. 1941).
6 The maxim in West Virginia is narrow in its scope and is therefore of
little weight. The following cases apply to the usurpation of the powers of
taxation by municipalities: City of Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Gratt. 385 (Va.
1S95) ; City of Fairmont v. Bishop, 69 W. Va. 308, 69 S. E. 802 (1909) ; Fry v.
City of Ronceverte, 93 W. Va. 388, 117 S. E. 140 (1923); Vinson v. Wayne
County Court, 94 W. Va. 591, 119 S. E. 808 (1923). In Commonwealth v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 155 Va. 452, 155 S. E. 895 (1930), the statute was construed narrowly in favor of the taxpayer since there was doubt as to whether
there was an interest capable of being taxed -a life estate in a trust.
7United States v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931) (lien upon "property and rights of property" to secure the collection of federal income tax contemplates only tangible property).
S HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881) 1; Eldredge v. United States, 31 F.
(2d) 924, 927 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) ("the identification of property with things
tangible is primitive legal psychology").
O "The statute covering collection of taxes is broad and comprehensive and
Congress intended to subject all of a taxpayer's property, except that
specifically exempt to the payment of taxes. 'Property' is a word of very
bioad meaning and when used without qualification, may reasonably be construed to include obligations, rights and other intangibles, as well as physical
things. 'Property' within the tax laws should not be given a narrow or
technical meaning." Citizen's Bank of Barstow, Tex. v. Vidal, 114 F. (2d)
380, 382 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940). See McKenzie v. United States, 109 F. (2d)
540, 542 (1940); Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
143 Ky. 314, 323, 136 S.W. 1032 (1911). OHni GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938)
§ 5325-1 defines "used in business" as follows: "Monies, deposits, investments, accounts receivable and prepaid items, and other taxable items shall
be construed to be 'used' when they or the avails thereof are being applied, or
intended to be applied in the conduct of the business, whether in the state or
elsewhere."
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business" for tax lien purposes as did the case of Harvey Coal &
Coke Co. v. Dillon ° with respect to property subject to taxation.
K. W., JR.
TORTS -

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE -

EXTENT OF DUTY TO

PROTEST AG.INST RECIKES DRIVNG. -P's decedent, riding in the
back seat of an automobile driven by D at an excessive speed, was
fatally injured when the car left the pavement at a curve and
struck a telephone pole. The deceased had made no protest to D,
but there was evidence that another passenger had registered a protest. Held, that where one passenger protests in an audible tone of
voice against the negligent conduct of the driver, the other passengers are relieved of any duty to protest. Boyce v. Black.1
The driver of a bus, traveling at night at an excessive speed,
drove over an uneven portion of the highway, causing the vehicle to
lurch in such a manner that P was thrown against the side, sustaining injuries. P, sitting in the rear of the bus in a relaxed position, had no time to protect herself. She had not warned the
driver concerning his excessive speed. The court set aside the
verdict for P solely because the damages were excessive, but approved the jury finding of no contributory negligence, stating that
a passenger seated in the rear of a bus has no duty to look constantly toward the front and protest to the driver. Miller v. Blue Ridge
TransportationCo.These recent decisions are indicative of the extent of the duty
of care required of a passenger in a motor vehicle. In previous
cases the court has said that the passenger must use such reasonable care for his own safety as an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under like circumstances. 3 The standard which our court
10 59 W. Va. 605, 633, 53 S. E. 928 (1905):
"It is insisted that tax a8ts
must be construed strictly, and if it is doubtful whether the intent is to levy
a tax on a thing, the doubt must be solved in favor of the tax payer. (Citing
cases.) As a general rule that is so; but there is another rule here fitting.
The Constitution positively commands that all property shall be taxed, and we
must construe the statute as meant to obey the Constitution, if its words Wvill
at all allow it, and this act has a section taxing all property, and specific.
language covering chattels real. If there were doubt, we must rather resolve
it in favor of taxing leaseholds, and 'impute to the general assembly an intent
to obey the constitutional mandate, if its enactments fairly admit of such

construction.' "
115 S. E. (2d) 588 (W. Va.,1941).

215 S. E. (2d) 400 (W. Va. 1941).
3Lewellyn v. Shott, 109 W. Va. 379, 155 S. E. 115 (1930) ; Herold v. Clendennen, 111 W. Va. 121, 161 S. E. 21 (1931) ; Oney v. Binford, 116 W. Va. 242,
180 S. E. 11 (1935); Broyles v. Hagerman, 116 W. Va. 267, 180 S. E. 99

(1935).
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